This article traces the intellectual evolution of Zhang Chengzhi (b. 1948 
Chinese dissidence being an inevitably anti-Communist, pro-Western phenomenon. His stance is in many ways rebellious within the context of contemporary Chinese politics.
He criticises Chinese officialdom and the promotion of the market economy that has been CCP policy since the 1990s. He endorses popular resistance and protest in a way that is discordant with a state policy focused on quelling unrest in Xinjiang. He praises Palestinian guerrilla actions and Japanese leftwing terrorists who fought for the Palestinian cause, describes Han policy in Xinjiang as colonial, and encourages the growth of a culturally and socially distinct ethnic identity for Chinese Muslims. Yet he combines these views with a vehemently anti-Western stance, and a passionate adherence to the tenets of revolutionary Maoism (he has for decades championed the kind of "tothe-people" rhetoric promoted by Xi Jinping's administration since November 2012, and that has prompted speculation that Xi is orchestrating a return to Mao-style politics).
Zhang's public stance is in significant ways individualist but -due to his residual attachment to the populist principles of Mao's revolution -not within the "liberal democratic" tradition that Western-centric analysis associates with the historical rise of individualism.
Zhang's dissidence is, moreover, strikingly distinct from the types of political rebelliousness manifested by the majority of mainland Chinese creative writers since the 1990s. In their output and outward behaviour, serious literary authors since the 1990s have distanced themselves from the politics and identities of pre-1989 socialist Chinese society and culture. The works of China's best-selling, most critically acclaimed novelists (Mo Yan, Yan Lianke, Yu Hua) have attacked the government-enforced collectivism of the Mao era. The next generation of writers, who rose to prominence in the 1990s (sometimes dubbed "New Generation writers", xinshengdai zuojia), migrated further towards an alienated individualism, expressed not only in their creative writing but also in their extra-literary activities (the locus classicus being the manifesto "Rupture" (Duanlie), a public statement of this generation's sense of antagonism towards the socialist literary establishment (Zhu 1998)). In China today, it is highly unusual to encounter a serious creative writer who actively espouses engagement with organized politics. Even as established novelists such as Mo Yan and Tie Ning participate in state-run organisations such as the Writers' Association, this involvement does not constitute a programme for political activism. Indeed, the Writers' Association now often presents itself as a politically neutral, professional organization supporting authors, sharply distinct from its highly politicized profile of the Mao and early Deng eras. The works of writers such as Yan Lianke, Zhu Wen and A Yi (three variously rebellious voices, born in 1958, 1967 and 1976 respectively) present highly critical portraits of the societies created by Mao and Deng, which are thus implicitly critical of state policies and their effects. Yet these authors themselves shun any public, collective political identity. In 2014, one such writer complained that "politics" -by which he meant government, or organised politics -was "boring, dirty", even while his fiction is highly disparaging of contemporary Chinese society and, by logical extension, of the political architects of this society. In a context in which many serious writers feel themselves alienated from organized politics, Zhang
Chengzhi is thus notable in strongly endorsing collective political activism (either far-left party politics of the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian guerrilla resistance to Israel, or a religious, political, cultural and socio-economic identity among Chinese Muslims).
The article is divided into two main sections. It begins with an account of Zhang's life and career, as these biographical details have a close bearing on his intellectual and literary development, followed by a review of relevant secondary analysis of Zhang's work and of the intellectual, political and cultural developments within which Zhang's work is situated. These include the rise of neo-Maoist thought and practice in in particular, about Zhang's use of multiple voices, and about his semi-fictionalised recasting of Chinese Muslim history. This article, however, will concentrate on his nonfiction (including a key memoir of the Cultural Revolution published only in Japanese, previously little discussed by Anglophone sinologists), both because it has received less attention in English than his fictional oeuvre and because this corpus of work gives us a more complete sense of his intellectual trajectory, and particularly of how he refracts his enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution into his current views of China and the world.
Before the article proceeds, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term "Maoism" or "Maoist", which will be deployed periodically to characterise Zhang's political stance. This term has been used both admiringly and pejoratively for several decades to signify a range of political behaviours: from an anarchic mass democracy, to Machiavellian brutality against political enemies. In this essay, the term will for the most part be modified by the descriptor "Cultural Revolution" (or "high"), to refer back to the set of ideas and experiences that dominated Zhang's formative education and early working life during the 1960s. These include veneration for the pre-1949 revolutionary heritage, a passionate commitment to the theory of "mass" political activism that validates rebellion against oppressive bureaucratic authority, and the willingness to invoke or deploy violence in the service of "revolutionary" rebellion. Zhang's understanding of Maoist principles will be discussed in more detail below, in relation to his invocation of the "Red Guard spirit".
Zhang Chengzhi: A Biography and Academic Overview
Zhang was born in 1948 in Beijing to a poor Hui Muslim family. Unsurprisingly, his family had to play down their religious identity during the Mao era: Zhang has written that, as a child, he was educated to think of Islam as "backward" and "feudal" (Zhang 2012, 5 ). Yet this suppressed religious identity would come to play a dominant role in his later life and career. Through hard work, Zhang was admitted to the elite middle school attached to Qinghua University, which is where he was studying when the Cultural Revolution began in the summer of 1966. At this point, Zhang entered "history". He self-credits with inventing the term "Red Guard" as used in the context of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. According to his version of events, in the spring of 1966 he began to sign off protest posters with the name "Red Guard" and an illustration of a horsemounted warrior. As the climate of protest intensified, his group of Qinghua middle school rebels decided, at a meeting in the Yuanmingyuan on 29 May 1966, to form a political group taking the name of Zhang's pseudonym: the Red Guards. Other groups quickly copied them (Zhang 1992, 40-54) .
In 1968, after two years of active participation in the Cultural Revolution (including student turmoil in Beijing and travels around China), Zhang volunteered to be sent down to Inner Mongolia, one of the most physically challenging areas of China.
There, he worked as a shepherd and then as a primary school teacher until 1972, at which point he was admitted to study archaeology at Beijing University as a student drawn from the ranks of "workers, peasants and soldiers". He then researched the history and languages of national minorities in northern China for a decade, doing fieldwork in some of the poorest and most marginalized parts of the Chinese landscape, in Gansu and in Xinjiang. He also spent periods of time as a visiting scholar in Japan.
Through the 1980s, he made a name for himself as a creative writer: of poems and autobiographical short stories and novels, predominantly romantic-pastoral narratives set in Mongolia and other PRC borderlands such as "Rivers of the North" (Beifang de he) and "The Black Steed" (Hei junma) (Zhang [1984 (Zhang [ , 1982 (Zhang [ ] 2000 . He became a prominent participant in the post-Mao literary thaw, which enabled Zhang and many of his peers to experiment with a range of new literary techniques and subjectivities. Today, Zhang still owes much of his fame as a writer and commentator to the literary attention that he garnered in the 1980s.
Between 1987 and 1989, his life underwent its next major change. After encountering (through fieldwork in Gansu) the Jahriyya, a Chinese Muslim Hui religious sect originating in northwest China in the 18 th century, Zhang emotionally rediscovered his Muslim roots and converted to the Jahriyya -a group, several hundred-thousand strong, distinguished from other Hui by the poverty and marginalization of its adherents, both past and present, and by its ascetic, uncompromising attitude to faith and sacrifice (Dillon 1999, 121-126; Gladney 1996, 48-52) .
In 1989 Zhang renounced all institutional ties, resigning from both his academic post and from the Writers' Association. In other words, Zhang voluntarily smashed his own "iron rice-bowl", a few years before the state began in the 1990s dismantling its own salary-for-life policy for government-sanctioned writers. Since that time, Zhang has relied on his income from freelance writing, in the process winning a reputation for himself as a polemical essayist, on subjects ranging from literature and architecture, to the War on 
From Red Guard to Global Islam: Zhang's Intellectual Journey
To trace out how Zhang has travelled between Cultural Revolution Maoism and his reading of global Islam requires a more detailed understanding of Zhang's admiration for Mao's political legacy. Zhang is particularly fixated on the "Red Guard Spirit" and the Cultural Revolution -on both its early phase of rebellion (zaofan) and the exile of Educated Youth to China's countryside. To Zhang, the Red Guard spirit can be summed up as worship of revolutionary ideals of self-sacrifice, as righteous rebellion against elitism and privilege, and as a drive to integrate with China's impoverished rural masses.
Zhang was brought up to revere the Communist revolution of the 1940s. As a child, he was schooled in revolutionary mythologies. His parents had worked underground for the Party before 1949 (though they were not themselves officials) and he loved to hear his mother tell him stories about such exploits (Zhang 1992, 18-20, 91) .
But his recollections of childhood resonate also with unease at the hierarchies and inequalities in Chinese society of the early 1960s. As a student, he felt a growing animosity towards the theory of revolutionary bloodline -that the offspring of revolutionary leaders were privileged in the New China, whereas the offspring of "bad elements" such as landlords were marginalized and denied opportunities (Zhang 1992, 24-26, 30) . From a young age, therefore, he was both obsessed with the utopian ideal of a revolutionary community, and also conscious of the injustices of the revolution in power.
His For Zhang, therefore, the legacy of the Cultural Revolution is twofold. It gave expression to his hatred of inherited privilege and discrimination; and enabled him to witness the oppressive effects of government in far-flung corners of China, and to integrate himself with "the masses". He writes:
I became an intellectual who could see the world from the perspective of the lowest stratum of society…Young people like me were losing our faith in state-sponsored theory.
We only believed in China itself. Every Educated Youth in 1970 had his or her own "farming, village story", based on their own life experiences, locked deep in their hearts (Zhang 1992, 188, 193) .
In The Jahriyya have been martyrs for two centuries…Since the Qing dynasty, they have periodically revolted against the government, always ready to sacrifice themselves for their religion. The Jahriyya are fervent citizens of China, steadfastly demanding that the purity of their faith be preserved. The Jayriyya, whom non-Jahriyya often refer to as "the bloody necks", are keeping alive in China the most remarkable spirit of rebellion (Zhang 1992, 198-199) .
This description clarifies the emotional and intellectual connection between Zhang's antiestablishment Red Guard convictions and later religious belief. The Muslim sect that he has chosen to join inhabits the poorest fringes of marginal Gansu and Ningxia; in Zhang has a very Maoist suspicion of the specialist academic and intellectual, even though he himself is a specialist academic by training and owes much of his knowledge to the opportunities to travel and study that Chinese academia has given him.
Although a witness to the terror tactics of the Red Guards, he is not averse to the use of political violence -as long as it is meted out for the right reasons. He writes: "Beating people up in principle -you shouldn't make an excessive fuss about that.
[But] it's unforgivable to beat or insult people on the basis of their bloodline" (Zhang 1992, 102 ).
This toleration of violence leads to troublingly laudatory appraisals of terrorist careers and actions, such as those of the AJRA. In his 1998 book Fire And Ice (Huo yu bing), a horrified Yu Jie described Zhang's continuing veneration for Mao as "red fundamentalism" (Barmé 1999, 353) .
Others again refuse to take him seriously. One Beijing professor of contemporary It was irrational, because China, with all its different nationalities, ought to make its people reflect more on such problems…I know full well that the contradictions within China are much more serious than anything in the former Yugoslavia. And Chinese history proves that at moments of crisis, people often become ever more bloodthirsty (Zhang 2007, 210 ).
This comment on the Yugoslav crisis is interesting not only for its implied criticism of
China's control and censorship of foreign news, but also for its decision not to engage with an aspect of the war far more widely discussed in China, namely the 1999 bombing by NATO forces of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which became the touch-paper for angry Chinese nationalist protest sanctioned by the state. Although Zhang robustly attacks US imperialism elsewhere in his essays, it is significant that he foregoes the opportunity here, perhaps to avoid distracting attention from his critique of China's inadequate public discussion of ethnic tensions. Back in 1966…the revolution that we yearned for was one in which our hands were tied; our ideals were regulated. The only slogans we could shout were "eternal loyalty to
Chairman Mao" and "eternally defend Mao Zedong thought". We didn't know at the time that we were rallying the leftwing and progressive students of countless countries across the globe into a great tide of global righteousness…It had two nucleuses: 
Conclusion
Despite its many inconsistencies and shortcomings, Zhang Chengzhi's Muslim Maoism demands serious consideration for its combination of political orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Zhang's career and actions draw on a long-term, firsthand engagement with the geographical, political, cultural and religious complexity of China. This engagement remains a questioning, cosmopolitan and surprising enterprise, one that ties literature and history firmly to contemporary Chinese and global politics. There is, to be sure, totalitarian nostalgia, egotistic machismo and anti-Western prejudice in Zhang's
Weltanschauung, but there is also a plea for dissidence and expressive freedom that, while taking inspiration from Maoist revolutionary doctrine, also paradoxically takes aim at China's own authoritarian political legacies.
This is a dissidence that defies easy categorisation. Zhang criticises the West, but also attacks Han China. He lionises Mao Zedong and Maoism's proletarian collectivism, but prizes above all the individualistic quest for religious and political answers. In short, Zhang forces us to expand our definitions of protest and of Maoist legacies in
